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Abstract We debate the motivation for and effec-
tiveness of public policies to encourage individuals to
become entrepreneurs. Reviewing established evi-
dence we find that most Western world policies do not
greatly reduce or solve any market failures but instead
waste taxpayers’ money, encourage those already
intent on becoming entrepreneurs, and mostly gener-
ate one-employee businesses with low-growth inten-
tions and a lack of interest in innovating. Most policy
initiatives that would have the effect of promoting
valuable entrepreneurship would not be recognizable
as such, because they would primarily address other
market failures: A central-payer health care would
remove healthcare-related distortions affecting
employment choices; greater STEM education would
produce more engineers of which some start valuable
new firms; and labor market reform to encourage
hiring immigrants in jobs they have been educated for
would reduce inefficient allocation of talent to
entrepreneurship.




Entrepreneurs are widely celebrated as job creators
and catalysts for economic growth. As a result,
perhaps unsurprisingly, many policy makers through-
out the world explicitly pursue policies that are aimed
at increasing the amount of entrepreneurship. The
purpose of this paper is to provide a critical discussion
of the motivation for and effectiveness of public
policies to encourage individuals to become entrepre-
neurs. The genesis of this work is a public debate
hosted by the Druid Society (DRUID 2015) in Rome
in July 2015, in which the four authors debated the
merits of public policy to promote entrepreneurship.1
Although we debated the question from opposing
points of view, we found that we were ultimately
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working from a common perspective regarding the pros
and cons of entrepreneurial public policy, and the aim of
this paper is to capture that debate. To that end, it follows
an unorthodox structure, with each section devoted to the
arguments each author provided in the debate.
Section 2 argues that the importance of
entrepreneurship warrants policy intervention: Once
we consider the importance of the entrepreneur in the
process of innovation, broadly construed, we are
compelled to act. Building on this, Sect. 3 argues that
spatial externalities of various forms constitute serious
market failures that require intervention. In contrast,
Sects. 4 and 5 are built from the idea that there are
three central tenets of good entrepreneurship public
policy. Entrepreneurship policies would be clearly
motivated if:
• Lots of people are trapped in jobs at established
businesses who would be better off self-employed;
• We as a society are worse off because of this;
• More policies like the ones we have would correct
this social problem.
Based on this framing, Sects. 4 and 5 argue that
public policies to encourage individuals to become
entrepreneurs generally lack a demonstrable economic
rationale.2 In the final section, we end by discussing
policy interventions that we all agree are likely to
effect entrepreneurship in a positive way.
Our discussion focuses on the goal of making
people start new businesses, not on the goal of creating
inventions or innovations. The motivation for sup-
porting invention and innovation has long been
established and will not be discussed here (see, for
example, Arrow 1962; Mansfield 1991). To be clear,
entrepreneurship-friendly policies are those which in
some way make it easier or cheaper for a person to
start a new business, maybe or maybe not conditional
on that they have developed a new business idea or
invented something. There are a plurality of such
policies ranging from subsidized lending or other
business cost subsidies (such as those provided by
accelerators or science parks), reduced taxes on equity
investments, reduced hiring costs, provision of
information or other market-making mechanisms,
location-specific or industry-specific subsidies to start
a business in a given location or industry, to name a
few. Table below (from A˚stebro forthcoming) pro-
vides a few examples which focus on general policies
of the kind which the four authors find agreement on
are especially difficult to provide social welfare.
Background Information: There are many public policies
subsidizing individuals (paying part of the cost for people) to
become entrepreneurs in various ways. For example, US tax
policies have traditionally favored sole proprietors relative to
wage earners and larger businesses. And government loan
guarantee schemes have been set up in, among others, the
USA, Canada, Germany and the UK. These programs (are
supposed to) guarantee loans at low interest rates for new firms
that are not able to obtain bank financing because the projects
are too risky. By fixing the interest rate at levels that do not
represent the risk, the borrowers are subsidized. As another
example, investors in entrepreneurial firms (typically the
entrepreneurs themselves) are sometimes credited with tax
breaks. For example, in Sweden capital income was until 2006
taxed at a flat rate of 30 %. But after 2006, the capital income
from unlisted shares in closely held corporations (primarily
held by entrepreneurs) became taxed at only 20 %,
representing a tax incentive for entrepreneurs. The real cost of
financing is reduced, and the money for this subsidy is raised
by taxing others. The UK government, not to be bested by the
Swedes, reduced the effective capital gains tax on business
assets held for more than 2 years from 40 to 10 % in 2008. In
Chile, the program Start-Up Chile began in 2010 offering
foreigner entrepreneurs a stipend of $40,000 a year, a 1-year
residency visa and a dedicated team of seven people to guide
them when they arrived in the country. The program has since
been copied by Canada and, lately, France.All these programs
represent monetary incentives for individuals to become
entrepreneurs. For further illustrations, see Parker (2007) and
Lerner (2009)
We mostly discuss the pros and cons of policies
affecting all people interested in entrepreneurship.
This means that the policies will mostly apply to those
currently employed as this group typically represent
the vast majority (about 62 %) of all consummated
entrepreneurial entries in a given year (A˚stebro and
Ta˚g 2015).
Reviewing established evidence, we find that most
Western world policies do not greatly reduce or solve
any market failures. Instead, the evidence suggests
that they waste taxpayers’ money, encourage those
already intent on becoming entrepreneurs and mostly
generate one-employee businesses with low-growth
2 Others have also come to the conclusion that supporting
individuals to become entrepreneurs are either typically not
warranted and/or difficult to get to work. See, for example,
A˚stebro (forthcoming), Blanchflower (2004), Hurst and Pugsley
(2011), Lerner (2009), Parker (2007) and Shane (2009a, b).
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intentions and few opportunities for meaning eco-
nomic innovation. Instead, most policy initiatives that
would have the effect of promoting valuable
entrepreneurship would not be recognizable as such,
because to be effective they would be rather tertiary to
the act of starting a business: A central-payer health
care would remove healthcare-related distortions
affecting employment choices; greater STEM educa-
tion would produce more engineers, some of whom
might start valuable new firms; and labor market
reform to encourage hiring immigrants in jobs they
have been educated for would reduce inefficient
allocation of talent to entrepreneurship.
2 The entrepreneur
Who is the entrepreneur is at the heart of much
confusion about entrepreneurship policy. Leiben-
stein’s (1968) suggests a theory of the economy and
entrepreneurship, in which entrepreneurship is a
significant factor in the development process. Accord-
ing to Leibenstein, the theory of competition gives the
impression that there is no need for entrepreneurship at
all. Let us start with a little microeconomics to lend
clarity to the debate. If all inputs and outputs are
marketed, if their prices are known, and if there is a
clearly defined production function that relates inputs
to outputs, then we can always predict the profit of any
activity that transforms inputs into outputs. Let us look
at an example.
Assume we have a supply and demand curve for
commodity X where the quantity supplied and the
quantity demanded are in equilibrium at price P. And
the price of the commodity X is equal to the average
total cost (ATC) and the marginal cost (MC). In other
words, P = ATC = MC. In this world, economic
profits are zero and there in no entry into the market.
Now assume that demand increases for commodity X,
price rises and we now have economic profit in the
market. The short-run increase in demand will be met
by existing suppliers but in the long-run higher profits
will encourage the entry of new firms.
We now have an opening for the entrepreneur
(Kirzner 1973). The assumption is that there are always
agents that are ready to enter an industry if profits are
above equilibrium. This is a fair assumption. But let’s
be clear, this type of entry is routine. By routine
entrepreneurship we mean that the markets are well
established and clearly defined, prices are known and
the production function is well specified and we have
good information on the above.While some uncertainty
remains, no new knowledge is being applied in the
process. Routine entrepreneurship therefore is a type of
management. More importantly, however, the entre-
preneur here is the residual income recipient, i.e., the
business owner. The entrepreneur here is entitled to
both wages and profits. This definition of the entrepre-
neur is common in Europe and in many other places. So
the entrepreneur enters business and the vehicle does
not matter, if it is a sole trader, an establishment, a small
business or a corporation.
This type of entrepreneurship is competition in the
market. No new product is introduced. In exogenous
entry, the firms exist exogenously as well as the
product. Firms compete in the market on price and
quantity. This typology goes back to the early analysis
of Augustin Cournot, whose equilibrium concept
corresponds to the one that today we associate with
John Nash: Each firm independently chooses its
strategy to maximize profit given the strategy of each
other firm (Acs 2009).
However, routine entrepreneurship can lead to an
important public policy issue. Is the entrepreneur
qualified to run the business? Is s(he) a good manager?
Does s(he) have enough capital? And does the
entrepreneur have enough social capital to run the
business? In other words does the entrepreneur enter
with costs at the equilibrium level of minimum ATC?
How long will it take the firm to reach minimumATC?
We can continue this line of inquiry but I think you get
the point. Public policy can help disadvantaged
individuals achieve success in business at a cost.
Some of this could be market failure from a lack of
finance for entrepreneurs and some of it can be from a
lack of business training and entrepreneurial acumen
and some can be from information asymmetries. In
either event, it is a legitimate public policy issue.
In contrast to routine entrepreneurship at the other
end of the spectrum, we have Schumpeterian or novel
entrepreneurship (Baumol 1968, 2002). Novel
entrepreneurship is about introducing something into
the market that does not exist. In other words, the
demand and supply curve do not exist. By novel
entrepreneurship, we mean that activities necessary to
create or carry on an enterprise where not all the
markets are well established or clearly defined, and in
which the relevant parts of the production function are
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not known. In the case of novel entrepreneurship, not
all of the markets exist or operate well and the
entrepreneur, if s(he) is to be successful, must fill in for
the market deficiencies. The gap filling and input-
completing capacities are the unique characteristics of
the entrepreneur. With endogenous entry influenced
by the work on endogenous technical change, compe-
tition is for the market, where entry can replace the
incumbent (Acs et al. 2009; Plummer and Acs 2014).
The main obstacle to our understanding of the
entrepreneurial factor lies in the conventional formu-
lation of the production function. The culprits are the
following two assumptions: (1) that the complete set
of inputs is specified and known to all actual or
potential firms in the industry and (2) that there is a
fixed relation between inputs and outputs. The first
assumption is implicit. The second assumption is
explicit but it is rarely challenged. In novel
entrepreneurship, the supply curve does not exist and
the ATC and MC curves are not known. In novel
entrepreneurship, contracts for labor are incomplete,
finance operates under asymmetric information, the
production function is not completely specified or
known, and not all factors of production are marketed.
As a result, a role for those who can handle uncertainty
and for entrepreneurial agency in the process of
economic growth emerges.
In novel entrepreneurship, the public policy issue is
not an unqualified or under qualified entrepreneur; on
the contrary, s(he) is most likely very qualified. The
public policy issue in novel entrepreneurship is about
the enabling environment (Acs et al. 2014). The public
policy question is, ‘‘Does the environment allow the
entrepreneur to complete the production function and
fill in the missing input markets?’’ This is a question of
knowledge and knowledge spillovers, finance and
human capital. Some countries may have better insti-
tutions to allow for these types of activities while others
may not. Moreover, since competition here is for the
market not in the market, some countries may be more
reluctant to allow this sort of Stackelberg competition
that combines endogenous entry and market leadership
(Acs 2009). It creates disequilibrium.
Public policies to promote novel entrepreneurship
as opposed to routine entrepreneurship are different
and cannot be assumed to happen without policy
intervention (Baumol et al. 2007). But this interven-
tion is not about market failure because the markets do
not yet exist (Stenholm et al. 2013). They are about
creating an enabling environment. Perhaps if we want
to promote growth and innovation through novel
entrepreneurship, Schumpeterian dis-equilibrating
activities instead of Kirznerian equilibrating activities,
some form of support for an enabling environment is
needed.
3 Externalities and market failures motivating
policy
The mandate for a place, albeit a community, city,
region, state or entire country, to engage in
entrepreneurship policy is motivated by market fail-
ures and externalities. There are five main types of
market failures and externalities deterring people from
becoming novel entrepreneurs. The first involves
network externalities. Network externalities arise
from the value of capabilities by an individual or firm
and therefore its expected value, being conditional on
a location within close geographic proximity to other
entrepreneurial individuals and firms. This means the
value of an entrepreneur’s ideas, ability to discover
and develop opportunities and access key resources
are place dependent.
The growing literature on entrepreneurial ecosys-
tems (Li et al. 2015) suggests that being spatially
located within an entrepreneurial ecosystem enhances
the expected value accruing from entrepreneurship.
Saxenian (1994) provides compelling documentation
of the advantages offered to entrepreneurs accruing
from entrepreneurial network externalities. Cities or
regions with a paucity of entrepreneurial networks
face an imposing barrier in attracting entrepreneurs.
To address the market failure stemming from (a lack
of) entrepreneurial network externalities, compen-
satory policies can induce entrepreneurs to locate in a
place they would otherwise askew. It should be
emphasized that the severity of this source of market
failure is place specific and will be most prevalent in
cities and regions which have not developed a vibrant
entrepreneurial ecosystem.
The second source of market failure involves
knowledge externalities. Arrow (1962) explained
how and why knowledge constitutes a public good,
in that that they are characterized both by non-
excludability and by non-rivalry. Knowledge created
by one firm or organization, such as a university, can
be used by entrepreneurs to start and grow their
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entrepreneurial businesses. There are two aspects
shaping knowledge spillovers. The first involves the
extent of knowledge generated or produced. The
second involves its propensity to spill over. In terms of
the first, some cities and regions are rich in knowledge
based on R&D investments, human capital and
university research, while other places exhibit con-
siderably lower investments in knowledge. Similarly,
some cities and regions have a rich thicket of spillover
conduits, serving to facilitate the flow of knowledge
and ideas from the organization creating them to the
entrepreneurs that actually use them to generate
innovation. According to the knowledge spillover
theory of entrepreneurship, the decision to become an
entrepreneur can be an endogenous response to
knowledge created, but not commercialized, in an
incumbent organization. By using that knowledge to
start a new firm, the entrepreneur serves as a conduit
for the spillover of knowledge (Klepper 2016). Cities
and regions with a paucity of knowledge investments
and weak institutions facilitating the spillover of that
knowledge will generate a lower value of knowledge
spillovers. By contrast, places with rich knowledge
investments and strong spillover institutions will
generate a high value of knowledge spillovers. The
economics and management literature have concluded
that such knowledge spillovers tend to be geograph-
ically localized within close geographic proximity to
the knowledge source. Thus, to access such knowledge
spillovers, which in turn can contribute to raising the
expected value of the entrepreneurial activity, entre-
preneurs need to be spatially located close to the
source of that knowledge. Policy can address this
market failure by both inducing investments in
knowledge and facilitating knowledge spillover con-
duits, mechanisms and institutions.
The third source of market imperfection stems from
failure externalities. Failed entrepreneurial firms can
generate value that is used by third-party firms. For
example, the semiconductor, Fairchild, failed in
California. However, experience, ideas and product
innovations generated and innovation were suffi-
ciently, compelling that they served to launch not
only a host of companies, or what Klepper (2016) has
termed the ‘‘Fairchildren,’’ but also ultimately served
as the seedbed for the emergence of Silicon Valley
(Klepper 2016). In deciding whether to become or
remain an entrepreneur, the focus is typically on the
value created by and viability of the entrepreneurial
start-up. This underestimates the actual value created
for the place, i.e., the Bay Area, because some of the
value created can be appropriated and commercialized
by other entrepreneurs, even if the entrepreneurial
start-up fails. Thus, entrepreneurship can create social
value for the place, even if it does not for the actual
entrepreneur. Policy can remedy the concomitant
underinvestment in entrepreneurship by aligning the
social returns to entrepreneurship with the private
returns to entrepreneurship.
The fourth source of market failure emanates from
demonstration externalities. A role model or demon-
stration that being an entrepreneur can be positive,
regardless of the outcome, can influence the decision
of others to become an entrepreneur as well. The
market failure lies in the information that is transmit-
ted that (1) being an entrepreneur is rewarding and
viable, (2) certain capabilities and competencies are
required, and (3) entrepreneurs are compatible with
the particular place. The magnitude of the demonstra-
tion externalities is place dependent. A city or region
characterized by a paucity of entrepreneurship may
experience a higher entrepreneurial demonstration
value than a place where entrepreneurship is already
prevalent.
The fifth source motivating entrepreneurship policy
is sunk costs. This refers to costs which are sunk not by
entrepreneurs but rather by people, firms and organi-
zations in a particular community, city or region. One
aspect involves investments in fixed assets, such as
real estate or infrastructure. A different aspect
involves the human and dimension of linkages,
networks and relationships with people at the partic-
ular location. By the very nature of sunk costs, it would
be impossible, or at least not trivial, to replicate or
replace those human connections simply by moving to
a different location. A third aspect involves the
emotional attachment people can develop to a partic-
ular place, which may not be replicable simply by
moving.
In Exit, Voice and Loyalty, Hirschman (1970)
explains that decision makers will exit from a situation
where they are unable to exercise voice, or influence.
However, loyalty will keep them from exiting. In the
case of a city or region, decision makers with sunk
costs have a collective interest in facilitating growth-
inducing entrepreneurship, since leaving that place
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would incur non-recoverable costs. A rich and com-
pelling case study literature documents how the policy
mandate for entrepreneurship across a broad spectrum
of city and regional contexts coalesced from a
community of disparate firms, nonprofit organizations
and citizens. For example, Link (1995) shows how a
coalition of civic, government and business leaders
formed the mandate to create Research Triangle Park
in North Carolina, and Walshock and Shragge (2013)
show how entrepreneurship policy in San Diego
resulted from collective action by civic and business
leaders.
4 Who becomes an entrepreneur and why?
In this section, we present empirical evidence which
shows that the policy efforts that we generally see
implemented are an inefficient and ineffective way of
promoting outcomes that we care about because of
who typically becomes entrepreneurs and why people
typically becomes entrepreneurs.
4.1 Most people would be better off not becoming
entrepreneurs
First, we reiterate the three central tenets of good
entrepreneurship public policy. Entrepreneurship poli-
cies would be clearly motivated if;
• Lots of people are trapped in jobs at established
businesses who would be better off self-employed;
• We as a society are worse off because of this;
• More policies like the ones we have would correct
this social problem.
In this section, we will address the first two points,
while the third point is discussed in Sect. 6. This
section will show that neither one of the two first
points is true, that is, there are not a lot of people
trapped in jobs who would be better off self-employed,
and our society will not be better off if more people
leave employment for entrepreneurship.
The first evidence represents a stylized empirical
fact that has been hard to disprove; that most people
are economically better off staying employed rather
than becoming an entrepreneur. Figure 1 shows an
early and clear example which shows four earnings
distributions, where three of them are different types
of measures of earnings from self-employment, and
the fourth is the earnings from wage work.3 Wage
earnings are the solid line. The data were taken from
the USA in the mid-1980s and represent a stratified
random sample of the population of income earners
(Hamilton 2000).
Figure 1 clearly shows that all three measures of
self-employment earnings have most of their density
shifted to the left of the solid line wage earnings
distribution. While there can be differences in back-
ground observable and unobservable characteristics
between the two different groups, when Bart Hamilton
controls for such differences, there still remains a
significant negative difference in earnings for the
average individual between self-employment and
wage work. For example, Hamilton computes that
the accumulated earnings for an average self-em-
ployed person for about 20 years would be 35 % less
than if he would have stayed employed. This work has
since been replicated several times across a number of
different countries, and the typical ‘‘entrepreneurial
discount’’ has been estimated between 5 and 15 % per
year, which is a substantial annual penalty for
becoming and staying an entrepreneur (for reviews,
see A˚stebro 2012; A˚stebro and Chen 2014).
One might raise at least three counter-arguments to
the usefulness of the above data for guiding public
Fig. 1 Density of earnings for US wage earners and the self-
employed. From Hamilton (2000, Fig. 1)
3 The take-home or ‘‘draw’’, the profits based on the annual
report, or the equity-adjusted draw ‘‘EAD’’ which adds to the
draw the estimated change in the value of the equity of the
business.
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policy. The first is that it is not the earnings of the self-
employed which we as a society care about, but the
earnings (and employment) potential of the people
which become ‘‘novel’’ entrepreneurs, as discussed in
Sect. 3, however defined.4 As we will show, it is
clearly the case that if one examines a representative
cross section of self-employed the typical ‘‘en-
trepreneur’’ is a sole proprietor with no other employ-
ees and who is working in a relatively mature and
competitive industry such as the trades (e.g., con-
struction), small-scale services, or who owns a
restaurant or a retail business.
A second counter-argument is one of faulty mea-
surements. It could be that since the data from
Hamilton are cross sectional it does not represent
well-calculated deliberate decisions to enter
entrepreneurship, but rather a lot of ‘‘noise’’ and that
earnings rise with time in entrepreneurship as those
who has entered on mistaken grounds quickly exit.
A third argument is similar to the second, and it
makes the claim that novel entrepreneurial earnings
are much larger if one takes into account earnings
which are not reported to the tax authorities and
similarly not reported in surveys.
We will postpone a discussion on the types of
businesses which people typically start until Sect. 4.3.
However, we immediately note that if one implements
a general entrepreneurship-friendly policy, then one
obtains a response to this policy primarily from people
starting the types of businesses which Hamilton’s
study represents.
In order to indicate the earnings of novel entrepre-
neurs who base their new firms on intellectual
property, A˚stebro et al. (2013, 2015) examined the
earnings of former academics in Sweden and the USA
which decided to become full-time entrepreneurs.
These represent the types of entrepreneurs one may
care more about for the creation of wealth—they are
likely to have created an invention at their university
employer and are trying to commercialize this inven-
tion through an entrepreneurial act. In addition, they
leave their former employer and become full-time
entrepreneurs, so this is not a trivial decision. They
typically forego a steady and well-paid job for the
prospects of making something new under high
uncertainty. Consulting or other part-time efforts are
not included and so if entrepreneurial earnings appear,
they are more likely to be large. Finally, academic
institutions and universities have hosted inventors
creating some of the most important inventions for
society who in some cases have gone on to commer-
cialize the inventions themselves, for example Herbert
Boyer co-discovering genetic engineering and co-
founding Genentech while his partner Stanley Cohen
returned to the laboratory, and Craig Venter founding
Celera Genomics to commercialize gene sequencing.
Figure 2 draws similar types of density functions as
in Fig. 1. The figure shows the annual earnings from a
representative sample of academics in the USA with
Ph.D.s from Science, Technology, Engineering or
Medicine (STEM) who either stay in academia all
their life (the red line) or at some point in time leave
their employer to become an entrepreneur (the blue
line). Data are from the SESTAT database collected
by the National Science Foundation through repeated
surveys between 1993 and 2006, and the graph is
found in A˚stebro et al. (2015).
The story is not different from this specially created
sample of top-potential earning entrepreneurs than for
the self-employed in general. The academic entrepre-
neurs typically make a lot less money than those which
remain employed. The estimated (individual fixed
effects) earnings difference for a given person is
around 15 % less when becoming an entrepreneur.
The data are very similar when looking at Swedish
academic entrepreneurs similarly defined. For the
Swedish data, A˚stebro et al. (2013) had the unique
opportunity to also collect data on dividends and
earnings from sales of their businesses. These addi-
tional earnings were inconsequential and did not
change the general tendency of academics to earn
more if they stayed employed.
Addressing the second concern which claimed that
we are mis-measuring the earnings potential of
entrepreneurs in both above-reported studies by
including a lot of short-term business, in the third
graph we report on a study which compared earnings
for the self-employed who had been in business for at
least 10 years to the earnings of wage workers in
Denmark. The figure is taken from A˚stebro et al.
(2014) and is reproduced below as Fig. 3. The
figure also clearly shows that even if one excludes
those who may have made a mistake by entering and
quickly leave self-employment to go back to wage
work, the earnings for the remaining self-employed
4 Sometimes called ‘‘true’’ or ‘‘real’’ or ‘‘high-growth’’, or
(bizarrely) ‘‘gazelles’’.
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are still predominantly less than the earnings for those
in wage work.
This graph provides an additional interesting point
which we will return to in the next subsection. Even
though the expected utility of entrepreneurship appears
less than the alternatewagework, themedian income is
clearly less, people persist in entrepreneurship, even
after 10 years. Why would they persist? By the time
they have been in business for 10 years, it surely must
be obvious to them that they could make more money
by working for someone else.
The final argument against using all these data for
policy purposes is that income may be severely
underreport by entrepreneurs but not by wage workers.
Wages for stayers
Earnings for movers
Fig. 2 Probability density
functions of earnings for
those moving to
entrepreneurship from
academia (blue line) and
wages for those staying in
academia (red line) (1993
US dollars). Source A˚stebro
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Earnings in Thousands of DKK
Self Employed Employees
Fig. 3 Annual earnings in
thousands of Danish Kroner
for self-employed (solid
line) with at least 10 years of
business operations and
wage workers (dashed line).
From A˚stebro et al. (2014)
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Comparing reported earnings may then not be mean-
ingful. Indeed, several papers have estimated that
entrepreneurs underreport their income by between 10
and 40 % (see review in A˚stebro and Chen 2014).
However, even though people apparently can more
easily hide income from the tax man by becoming
entrepreneurs, the policy conclusions from these
findings are not necessarily that it is a good idea to
encourage people to become entrepreneurs. Indeed,
this would make for very bizarre public policy. Take,
for example, Greece, which has the highest rate of self-
employment in the E.U. and also the largest difficulty
of collecting taxes owed from these self-employed. It
is not at all obvious that the remedy to the financial and
economic problems in Greece is to encourage greater
self-employment rates. Instead, one might argue that
these results indicate that there are even greater
opportunities to collect tax from entrepreneurs than
what is typically accomplished (and in particular in
Greece). Several papers also show that larger compa-
nies and entrepreneurs which start incorporated firms
are likely to underreport their income substantially
less than small sole proprietorships arguably due to the
more detailed scrutiny of accounts in corporations
(Engstro¨m and Holmlund 2009; Schuetze 2002),
suggesting that tighter financial auditing of entrepre-
neurs may in fact be motivated.
Overall, the earnings data paint a picture of people
behaving as if they were playing poker at the casino.
Most lose money, but there is a small percentage of
people that make a whole lot more money as
entrepreneurs than they would as wage workers. A
policy conclusion from these data is that subsidizing
entrepreneurship would be like collecting taxes so we
could give out free poker chips to encourage more
people to play poker. This does not look like sound
public policy.
4.2 People choose to become entrepreneurs
predominantly because they like it
In the previous section, we showed evidence that most
people are not better off becoming entrepreneurs. An
immediate question following this evidence is: Why
do people then become entrepreneurs? In this section,
we will present compelling evidence, indicating that
one of the most prominent explanations is that a lot of
people like to become/be entrepreneurs. A preference
for entrepreneurship immediately explains why people
enter into entrepreneurship although they will be
making less money—they simply trade off lower
income for higher consumption utility.
We start by showing that there is a strong prefer-
ence for becoming an entrepreneur. In fact, there are
substantially greater fractions wanting to be entrepre-
neurs than the actual rates of self-employment across a
wide variety of countries. The proportion of citizens
who favor being an entrepreneur over wage worker
vary from 80 to approximately 30 % (Blanchflower
2004, Table 7).5 Poland, Portugal and the USA topped
the league in 1997/1998, with roughly three quarters of
citizens preferring to be entrepreneurs. These propor-
tions seem extraordinarily large and cannot be moti-
vated only by earnings opportunities. In the bottom of
the league come Scandinavian countries. In these
nations, roughly 30 % of citizens say they want to be
an entrepreneur.
We continue by reporting that the preference for
entrepreneurship is mostly driven by non-pecuniary
reasons. Table 1 reproduces data reported by Hurst
and Pugsley (2011) taken from the panel study of
entrepreneurial dynamics, a survey conducted in 2006
representing a sample of ‘‘nascent’’ US entrepre-
neurs—those actively involved in the process of
starting a business. Table shows percentages for the
first reason given. There is direct evidence that people
are mostly concerned about enjoying being an
entrepreneur. The main reason for becoming an
entrepreneur is various non-pecuniary motivations,
while only 19.5 % reports making money as the main
reason.
That non-pecuniary considerations dominate the
decision to become entrepreneur is indirectly sup-
ported by several articles. For example, it is well
documented that across a wide range of countries, self-
employed are more satisfied with their work than wage
workers (see A˚stebro 2012 for references). Fixed-
effect analysis shows that those who move to self-
5 The question in the International Social Survey Programme
was formulated ‘‘Suppose you were working and could choose
between different kinds of jobs. Which would you prefer: being
an employee or being self-employed?’’ Information covers
citizens from more than twenty countries surveyed between
1997 and 1998.
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employment become happier. Further, using the
unification of East and West Germany as a natural
experiment, Benz and Frey (2008b) show that this
result is not due to reverse causation (i.e., that more
happy people enter entrepreneurship). Self-employed
report they are more satisfied with their jobs because
their work provides more autonomy, flexibility and
skill utilization and (strangely) greater job security
(Hundley 2001). Benz and Frey (2008a) discover that
more interesting work and greater autonomy are
mostly responsible for the difference in job satisfac-
tion scores between entrepreneurs and employees.
Various types of data thus give a consistent opinion:
People choose entrepreneurship primarily because
they like it. There is absolutely nothing wrong with
this. But supporting people who want to enjoy
becoming entrepreneurs would be like taxing non-
smokers so the government can buy cigarettes and
give to people who enjoy smoking. This kind of policy
does not make sense from a social welfare perspective.
If people want to become entrepreneurs, they should
do so without any subsidies collected from others.
4.3 Overwhelmingly entrepreneurs do not create
any value beyond private benefits
Even if we have been able to convincingly show that
most entrepreneurs would be better off staying
employed, and most people enter entrepreneurship
because they like to rather than to make money, it
might be that entrepreneurs create a lot of social
welfare (for others) even if they do not make much
money for themselves. Take, for example, the two
cases of Herbert Boyer and Craig Venter we discussed
before. Even if they happened to get rich, there might
be a plurality of entrepreneurs who do not get rich but
where society got much better from their efforts. In
this section, we will show that this is an unlikely
conclusion.
To illustrate that welfare gains from entrepreneur-
ship are likely very small, we return to data compiled
by Hurst and Pugsley (2011) from the panel study of
entrepreneurial dynamics.6 We use answers regarding
innovation and R&D activities to indicate the potential
for welfare gains. Our point here is that if there are
welfare gains from entrepreneurs, these would be most
likely to appear if entrepreneurs innovate, as innova-
tive activities are the most difficult to appropriate and
which gains might more easily spill over to others.
Authors have previously shown that small firms are
proportionally more likely to innovate than large firms
(the seminal work being Acs and Audretsch 1990), so
this seems on the face of it a plausible argument.
However, it turns out that most entrepreneurs are
unlikely to innovate or conduct R&D. Table 2 reveals
that only a small fraction of entrepreneurs have
produced a patent (4.9 %) or developed a proprietary
technology (6.5 %), as part of their start-up activities.
And rather surprising, only a quarter believes that
R&D is a major priority for them. Instead, a rather
large fraction (35.7 %) state when they enter that
many existing firms already offer the same product or
service to expected customer base. Many new firms
are thus of a me-too character, simply imitating what is
already in the market. The fractions which focus on
innovation increases after 4 years of operations,
indicating that successful entry indeed is associated
with innovating. Nevertheless, R&D still does not
weight heavily in the minds of the entrepreneurs and
6 Using the Kauffman Firm Survey, Hurst and Pugsley (2011)
show that these results are not a function of the special sampling
process in the PSED, but general to all startups.
Table 1 Reasons for starting business
Reason First reason (%)
Non-pecuniary motivation (I want to be my own boss; tired of working for others;
flexibility; set my own hours; enjoy work…)
35.3
To generate income 19.5
Had A Good Business Idea/Create New Product 32.2
Lack of Other Employment Options 2.2
Other 10.8
Original Data Source Panel Study of Entrepreneurial Dynamics. Responses to question ‘‘Why do you want to start this business?’’
Source Hurst and Pugsley (2011), Table 9
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four out of ten firms still focus on providing me-too
products.
A different approach of looking at the potential for
spillovers is to examine the type of industries which the
typical start-up enters into. If start-ups are more likely
in high-tech industries, then maybe that would be an
argument for supporting them with policies. We have
already mentioned some of the most likely industries
where entrepreneurs go into and so a more detailed
analysis will bring no surprises. Hurst and Pugsley
(2011) rank all 294 four-digit level industries in the
USA by the fraction of firms within the industry which
have \20 employees, a proxy for the intensity of
entrepreneurship by industry. Their analysis shows that
most small businesses are either restaurants, skilled
professionals (physicians, dentists, lawyers, accoun-
tants, architects, consultants), skilled crafts persons
(general contractors, plumbers, electricians, masons,
painters, roofers), professional service providers
(clergy, insurance agents, real estate agents), general
service providers (auto repair, building services such as
landscaping, barbers and beauticians) or small retailers
(grocery stores, gas stations, clothing stores).
Maybe entrepreneurs are not very good at gener-
ating economic welfare, but they might be the source
of most new employment? Indeed, studies have
recently shown that it is primarily the new firms
which generate most aggregate employment growth
(Haltiwanger et al. 2013). However, Hurst and Pugs-
ley (2011) provide some convincing evidence from the
USA that, while aggregate job creation is higher
among new firms, most new firms (with employees)
create very little amount of new jobs. The point is that
the distribution of job growth among new firms is
highly skew and any policy aimed at stimulating the
average entrepreneur would thus be ineffective.
Maybe the most interesting evidence they report is
the following. Posed with the question in the PSED
‘‘Which of the following two statements best describe
your preference for the future size of this new
business: I want this new business to be as large as
possible, or I want a size I can manage myself or with a
few key employees?’’ only one-quarter of entrepre-
neurs answers that they want the business to be as large
as possible.
We turn to some Swedish data to indicate the lack
of job creation by entrepreneurs in general. The
benefits of the Swedish data are that it can track
employment in all new firms. A˚stebro and Ta˚g (2015)
show that in Sweden, 84 % of all entrepreneurs are
sole proprietors, and among them, it requires 10
entrepreneurs to create one job for another person
within the first 2 years of operations.7 Those entre-
preneurs who start a limited liability firm have better
employment growth in the first 2 years, creating 1.73
additional jobs. Unfortunately, only 16 % of all new
firms are started as limited liability businesses, and
employment in these firms retract to 0.36 additional
employees per entrepreneur after 6 years of opera-
tions. The latter statistic reflects that the failure rates
are high among these companies due to the inherent
risk of entrepreneurship. See Table 3.
Unfortunately, we must therefore disappoint the
policy maker also when it comes to job creation. Most
new firms create no additional jobs beyond those for
the entrepreneurs themselves. If these entrepreneurs in
addition arrive from paid employment, then there is no
7 Source: Statistics Sweden, register-based data covering
2005–2009, reflecting the total labor force and 24.5 million
year-individual observations. A firm closed during the period is
counted as hiring zero employees.
Table 2 Innovation-related activities by nascent entrepreneurs
Indicator First year
(%)
Fifth year and positive
revenues only (%)
Firm had applied for patent, copyright or trademark 4.9 17.6
Had developed proprietary technology 6.5 20.3
Owner stated that many existing firms already offer the same
product or service to expected customer base
35.7 39.6
Expected R&D spending to be a major priority for the business 25.7 22.8
Original Data Panel Study of Entrepreneurial Dynamics. Source Hurst and Pugsley (2011), Tables 7 and 8
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new net job creation, only a reshuffling of work. Of
course, such reshuffling is part of the animal spirit of
entrepreneurship and not a bad thing. But one should
not look to the average entrepreneur as the giant job
creator.
This section has shown that most entrepreneurs
enter into highly contested markets, with products and
services that are typically already offered, and where
there is already a large supply present. Few new firms
enter to innovate, and very few entrepreneurs hire
anyone except themselves and have no interest or
ability to expand after creating a job for themselves. In
conclusion, supporting people to become entrepre-
neurs would mostly support one-man me-too shops in
low-growth, low-margin industries where there is no
or little innovation undertaken.
5 Well-intended public policies often go wrong
In the introduction, we argued that there were three
prerequisites to any policy intervention: willing and
able entrepreneurial talent stranded in wage employ-
ment; an economy made worse off as a result; and the
ability of policy aimed at stimulating entrepreneurship
to fix the problem. In this final section, we argue that
even if the allocation of talent across the wage earning
and the entrepreneurial sector is sub-optimal, even if
we suffer collectively as a result, that there is little
evidence that simple or proximate policy fixes have
any efficacy. Instead, policies often backfire because
economic agents are typically able to think several
moves ahead of policy makers on the entrepreneurship
chess board.
5.1 Labor markets
Consider first the fact that well-intended labor market
interventions often have unintended and costly con-
sequences. French labor market policy provides an
illustrative example. In an attempt to lower the
administrative burden associated with complying with
French labor union regulations, the French enacted a
policy exempting organization with fewer than 50
employees. Figure 4, taken from Garicano et al.
(2012), plots the firm size distribution as a function
of the number of employees.
The figure clearly shows a spike in the number of 49
person firms, and an utter lack of 50 or 51 person firms.
For the purposes of comparison, the figure also plots
the US firm size distribution, which helps to illustrate
the magnitude of the discontinuity induced by the
policy.
The message from the graph is simple and is
explored in detail in Garicano et al. (2012): don’t cross
the 50-person threshold, because the cost of hiring the
50th employee is not just that person’s wages, but the
entire fixed cost of compliance to a higher standard of
labor regulation. The policy measure, ostensibly
introduced to make economic life less burdensome
for small business operators, creates an unintended
valley of death for firms as they grow. Through their
own optimal choices, business owners effectively
become pinned behind the 50-person barrier until they
grow far enough beyond the threshold to amortize the
fixed cost of policy compliance over a much larger
labor base. Garicano et al. (2012) suggest that the cost
of this policy is on the order of a 5–10 % increase in
overall wages at these firms.
5.2 Capital markets
Moving from labor markets to capital markets,
consider first the banking sector. Robb and Robinson
(2014) show that formal bank lending is a critical
source of financing for new businesses (not just small
ones). Given the importance of the banking sector for
the small business and young business economy, it is
perhaps not a surprise that the US Small Business
Administration provides a loan guarantee program
Table 3 Most entrepreneurs create small non-growing firms
Number of people hired by founding entrepreneur After 2 years After 6 years
Sole Proprietorship (84 % of all) 0.10 0.09
Incorporated (16 %) 1.73 0.36
Original Data Statistics Sweden matched employee–employer register. Source A˚stebro and Ta˚g (2015)
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aimed at stimulating bank lending to the small
business sector.
The SBA 7A loan program operates as a guarantee
program: Banks make loans but if the loans conform to
the eligibility criteria for the SBA, the SBA guarantees
the loan in the event of default. Given that the
ostensible role of the program is to facilitate the
extension of loans to a cohort that might not otherwise
qualify for a traditional bank loan, one might reason-
ably expect these loans to command higher interest
rates.
de Andrade and Lucas’ (2009) analysis of SBA loan
spreads interest rate spreads, and corresponding
default rates on SBA confirm this intuition. They find
that between 1998 and 2006, SBA 7a loans were
around 2 % over the prime lending rate. As Fig. 5
illustrates, SBA 7A Express loans were anywhere
from 2.5 to 4 % higher.
Although it is reasonable to assume that these loans
are more expensive for banks to service, the question
is whether default rates or other costs justify the higher
interest rates. Their analysis suggests not. As Fig. 6
illustrates, they find that default rates on SBA loans
hover between BBB and BB corporate loans, in spite
of costing much more in terms of interest costs.
In light of the vast literature on the importance of
relationships in banking for facilitating information
transmission between borrowers and lenders, and the
attendant switching costs that obtain in such environ-
ments, an extreme interpretation of these findings
would be that the well-intentioned effort to stimulate
lending to underserved small business borrowers
created information monopolies for lenders servicing
SBA-qualified lenders, allowing them to earn super-
normal rents on the loans they extend to borrowers that
would otherwise be screened out from the market.
Banking markets are not the only capital markets in
which well-intentioned policy efforts can backfire.
Cumming and MacIntosh’s (2006, 2007) analysis of
the Canadian government’s attempts to stimulate the
amount of venture capital in Canada provides an
illustrative example. In an attempt to stimulate the
amount of venture capital flowing to Canadian inno-
vators, the Canadian government initiated a labor-
sponsored investment fund or labor-sponsored venture
capital corporations (LSVCCs)—a fund in which
private individuals could make individual contribu-
tions, much like to mutual funds, but which invested in
private companies. These funds are closely related in
structure to the Venture Capital Trusts (VCTs) seen in
the UK (Cumming 2003). As Fig. 7 illustrates,
Cumming and MacIntosh (2007) find that these funds
dramatically underperform relevant benchmark
returns and that they suffer from unusually high fees
(with management expense ratios averaging at 4 %,
they exceed the most expensive venture capital funds).
The culprit, as with VCTs, appears to be the peculiar
governance structure under which they are required to
operate (Cumming and MacIntosh 2007). Their ulti-
mate conclusion is that the tax subsidies to individuals
that underpin the creation of LSVCCs actually
crowded out private capital to Canadian start-ups
(Cumming and MacIntosh 2006). Thus, this is more
evidence of policy backfire.
Canada’s and the UK’s efforts to stimulate venture
funding illustrate a common problem faced by policy
makers, which is the tendency to formulate policy ex
post based on observed outcomes without regard to the
unobservable ex ante characteristics of the distribution
that led to those outcomes. Policy makers want more
Facebooks and Googles, and so they encourage
tinkering in garages, but in so doing they fail to
recognize that most new ideas are bad ideas, not good
ones. Much of capital market policy intended to
stimulate entrepreneurship works to create more
needles by encouraging more haystacks.
If there is an underlying economic reasoning that
connects these examples, it would be that policy to
promote entrepreneurship too often operates on partial
equilibrium assumptions. That is, policy makers
observe a market equilibrium with which they are
reasonably dissatisfied and attempt to correct it, but
Fig. 4 Firm size distribution in the USA and France. Taken
from Garicano et al. (2012)
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their policy fails to account for the fact that economic
agents will re-optimize in the presence of the new
policy. As a result, the policy backfires. Just as the
British Raj’ attempt to eliminate cobras by offering a
bounty for every dead cobra backfired by creating a
thriving market for baby cobras (which were then
subsequently released into the streets and gutters when
the bounty was rescinded, compounding the problem it
was intended to solve), most attempts to stimulate
entrepreneurship through narrow policy stimulus
backfire because they fail to internalize the incentives
they create. It would seem that ‘‘ordinary’’ economic
agents understand the Lucas critique (Lucas 1976)
better than policy makers do.
Fig. 5 Interest rate spreads on SBA-backed loans compared to other business loans. Taken from de Andrade and Lucas (2009)
Fig. 6 Cumulative default rates on SBA loans. Taken from de Andrade and Lucas (2009)
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6 Conclusions
This paper is a debate about whether there is a strong
motivation for public policies to stimulate more
people to enter entrepreneurship and self-employ-
ment. The debate captured in this article is structured
around a policy litmus test: For policy interventions
aimed at stimulating entrepreneurship to be warranted,
there should be evidence of the need for more
entrepreneurs, evidence of harm to society from the
undersupply of entrepreneurs, and evidence that
policy interventions can correct the problem.
With this litmus test, we can summarize our debate
as follows. One author argues that this litmus test
should be rejected because entrepreneurship, as
opposed to self-employment or small business activ-
ity, is essential for creating new markets and new
products that would not exist but for the ingenuity and
panache of the entrepreneur. Building on this, one
author argues that spatial externalities in entrepre-
neurial ecosystems constitute de facto market failures
that compel us to act. In contrast, one author argues
that there is little empirical evidence supporting the
idea that society is harmed by the purported lack of
entrepreneurship, and one argues that even if it were,
there is little in the way of historical evidence to
suggest that previous policy interventions have
worked when they have been aimed directly at
stimulating self-employment, and thus, little reason
to think they will in the future.
This is not to say that bad policy decisions do not
impede entrepreneurship. Nor is it to say that well-
informed (as opposed to well intentioned) policy
initiatives would not impact society in positive ways.
Our claim is that the interventions required are likely
not to sound like entrepreneurship policy. Consider the
debate in the USA regarding health care. Decoupling
the provision of health insurance with employment is
likely to remove a distortion in the self-employment
decision that prevents people with good ideas but
costly medical issues from leaving paid employment
to start new businesses. Evidence from Fairlie et al.
(2011, 2016) suggests that this distortion could be
sizeable. But policy initiatives like this do not sound
like entrepreneurship policy when they are described
in the press: They are packaged as healthcare initia-
tives. Likewise, greater STEM education and better
access to STEM education among women and
minorities would likely produce more engineers.
Some of these engineers would no doubt go on to
launch innovative new businesses; others would no
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Fig. 7 Performance of LSVCCs relative to other benchmarks. Taken from Cumming and MacIntosh (2006)
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thought of as entrepreneurship; it is education policy.
Labor market reform to encourage hiring immigrants
in jobs they have been educated for would reduce
inefficient allocation of talent to entrepreneurship.
This is not entrepreneurship policy, this is immigration
reform. Indeed, if we accept that entrepreneurship is a
deeply ingrained feature of many Western economies,
we should not be surprised that successful policy
measures will likely involve subtle and pervasive
policy initiatives that have the unintended conse-
quence of changing people’s minds about the costs and
benefits of entrepreneurship.
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